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The Ideal Type of Authority in the United States and Germany

Abstract

An ideal type of authority is developed from the literature identifying three dimensions of meaning. This ideal type is then used as a measurement rod to compare U.S. and German subjects. Because their power is legitimated by cultural rules, authorities are positively evaluated despite their ability to coerce. Since their power is understood, authorities need not engage in expressive action to demonstrate their power. The affective meaning of role identities reflects their structural meaning, such as authority. Role identities, rated on three-dimensional semantic differential scales of affective meaning, are classified using a K-means clustering algorithm to empirically generate clusters of structural meaning. The cluster discussed here corresponds to the ideal typical authority category of potent, positively evaluated, and not expressive role identities. Using two studies that involved more than 1700 U.S. and German subjects, I find a high degree on cross-cultural agreement on what is to be classified as an authority. However, with the structural categories of authority established, identities in the common component of authorities identified by U.S. and German youth differ significantly in confirming the ideal type of authority. German youth dislike the power potential of authorities more than their US counterparts.

The Ideal Type of Authority in the United States and Germany

Identity and Social Structure

According to Mead (1913, 1934) and Cooley (1922), reflexivity is a necessary prerequisite for the construction of a self. Mead's concept of self is a self-conscious ego that merges in the interaction between the "I" and the "me." Without the interaction of the self with previous stages of itself and/or with selves that take the attitude of another, there will be no development of the self. The person will, in the words of Mead, "leave the field of the values to the old self (1913, p.378)" which Mead calls selfish. "The justification for this term [selfish] is found in the habitual character of conduct with reference to these values" (p.378). Mead stated that the development of the self is dynamic, a process of development that was later systematized by Strauss (1994) who, in his biographical historical methodology, emphasized the social histories of the identity.

Building the self (Burke 1980, Stryker 1980, Stryker and Burke 2000) in social histories of interaction (Strauss 1994), identities reflect the structure of society. Identities are self-meanings. They are reflexive in respect to the self and to others. To the extent that they involve others, they reflect structural properties. This is used as the minimum definition of social structure. Structural meaning is central for the affective representation of identities, actually so central that social structure serves as a schema for cognitive classification (Schneider 1999). Here, the concept of reflexivity is important for bridging the individual concept of identity and the structural concept of the ideal type of authority that allows a macro level of social and cultural structural phenomena. This study demonstrates that the authority concept is an ordering mechanism in the affective meaning of authorities.

Defining the Authority Concept for Operationalization

Being coerced is an unpleasant predicament, and generally leads to resentment toward the coercer, but if the other's coercion is legitimated, then he or she is an authority and may be evaluated positively (Weber, 1946). In fact, it is part of the ideal type for an authority that it is someone who is powerful, yet positively evaluated. Examples of powerful, legitimated and therefore highly evaluated role identities are the roles of *surgeon*, *counselor*, and *specialist* (role identities that are italicized are taken from the empirical sample described below).[1]

Also high status may be assigned to a political operative as long he follows accepted bureaucratic rules, but political operatives are villains or even terrorists when people do not share their cultural rules of legitimation. Cultural norms or rules are the source of the legitimation of power. Coercive persons are devaluated if there are no cultural rules to legitimize this coercion.

Additionally, the legitimation of authority means that the authority's power is understood by others and need not be communicated through expressive actions, like eloquent speaking or simple brutality. Occurrence of expressive displays of power lead to questioning the expresser's legitimacy, so the ideal type for an authority expands to someone who is potent, positively evaluated, and securely undemonstrative. Emerson noted that "to have a power advantage is to use it, and to use it is to lose it" (1969: 391). Only if people are not using their power, they are able to maintain their authority. When powerful roles are expressive, they appear persuasive or physically active but not authoritative. Machiavellian persons who are engaged in power plays (e.g., *heroes*) appear persuasive, but not authoritative. Powerful and legitimated figures who display their power through physical activity (e.g., *athletes*) also do not fit the meaning of authority.

In developing a hypothetical ideal type for an authority, I presume that authorities cannot solely rely on their material power; they need to have power and status ascribed by others in order to get things done. Just as the leader is dependent on his followers (Burns 1971, Bass 1981), authority is based on socially constructed power and status, and there is no objective authority outside the situation in which actors and objects define and respond to each other. "Social structure in any of its aspects, as represented by such terms as social position, status, role, authority, and prestige, refers to relationships derived from how people act toward each other" (Blumer, 1969: 6-7).

Viewing authority as a social construction embedded in subjective representations of culture, I now turn to the question of whether people's subjective views of authority roles actually correspond to the ideal type I have specified. I do this with quantitative data from Germany (Schneider 1990) and the U.S. (Heise and Levis 1988), two nations with distinctive orientations toward authority. To study the subjective aspect of authority between cultures I employ Osgood's (1962; Heise 2000) approach to the measurement of affective meaning. Osgood found three dimensions -- evaluation (E), potency (P) and activity (A) -- are the basic dimensions of affective response. In one of the largest social science research projects ever conducted, Osgood, May and Miron (1975) found evidence for the cross-cultural universality of the EPA dimensions of affective response.

Following Kemper and Collins (1990), and Heise (1987, 2000), I view the EPA dimensions of affective response as analogues of a role's status, power, and expressiveness. EPA profiles measure sentiment that is attached to a specific role in a particular culture, and that sentiment arises from structural facts. The same concept might have a different sentiment in another culture. Differences in affective responses to sentiments can be used to interpret

sociocultural differences.

Data

U.S. Study

Data were collected by paper and pencil questionnaires from approximately 1300 undergraduates in North Carolina. Students were recruited from undergraduate classes, predominantly in the field of social sciences. The Doubleday Dictionary (Landau, 1975) was used to choose a broad range of general concepts to be rated on Evaluation, Potency, and Activity (EPA) dimensions. The poles of the scales were defined with clusters of adjectives:

Evaluation:	good, nice - bad, awful
Potency:	big, powerful - little powerless
Activity:	fast, young, noisy - slow, old, quiet

The order of the EPA scales and the orientation of the scale (left or right) were varied. Subjects had a "?" category to indicate unfamiliarity with the concept. Interval scales derived from successive intervals scaling were used to compute means on all three EPA differential scales. Further details on the study design and data collection is available in Smith-Lovin (1987), and the mean ratings by males and by females are available in Heise and Lewis (1988).

German Study

There is a dilemma for comparative studies that maximizing the representative within samples generally leads to minimizing equivalence between samples (Osgood 1974). Using a homogeneous student population, I maximize the equivalence and make compromises in the representativeness. The focus of this study lies on comparability not generalizability. For that reason, the emphasis is keeping the population from which the sample is drawn as similar as

possible in both cultures, as opposed to keeping both samples as representative as possible for their culture.

To correspond to the undergraduate population in the U.S., subjects were not only university students, but also pupils of the thirteenth grade in "*Gymnasium*".[2] About 400 subjects were recruited from Mannheim University, and two schools (*Gymnasien*) in Mannheim, a large industrial city attracting students mainly from the Rhein-Neckar region in former West Germany. Since subjects serve as cultural informants, I allow myself to generalize about the respective national culture.[3] Although, in the following I will speak of cultural differences one should keep in mind that the U.S. and German culture is represented by a subset of post adolescent youth with a predominant middle class heritage.

The German study (Schneider 1990) used the same semantic differential scales as the US study. The translation of the adjectives describing the poles of the evaluation, potency, and activity dimensions were validated in blind backtranslation. Instead of paper and pencil questionnaires a more modern computer-based measurement technology ATTITUDE (Heise and Levis 1988) was employed (Heise 2001).

The existing U.S. dictionary was used for the construction of the German stimuli set. U.S. idiomatic concepts like *fuddyduddy* or *hooligan* were dropped. As a fluent bilingual native German speaker, I translated 599 identities, 359 behaviors and 84 emotions into German. Then the method of blind back-translation (Krebs and Schuessler, 1987) was employed: Dr. Paul Jackson, a bilingual assistant professor in the Anglistic department at Mannheim University, translated the 1042 German concepts back into English. All concepts whose back-translation matched the original English were selected for further studies. The remainder was examined by David Heise, a native of U.S. culture, and words whose back-translations were synonymous with

the original also were selected. The resulting list of 768 well translated concepts was used as stimuli for the German data collection.

Cluster Analysis

Categories have to correspond to principles that organize identities cognitively. Structural properties are dominant principles in the organization of identities. These properties are in turn organized by the principle of rational bureaucratic organizations (Weber 1924; Schluchter 1972; Swedberg 1998) currently predominant in Western societies. The rational bureaucratic form of organization rules not only the professional life, but the way in which we perceive our environment. Consequently, institutional properties are one of the most important determinants in categorization. As explicated in role theory and identity theory (Stryker 1980; Burke and Reitzes 1981; Stryker and Burke 2000), role identities integrate both individual and structural information. Therefore, they are ideal for locating structural properties in affective representations. Structural membership is a persuasive property of an identity. The reader might imagine a *judge* without taking her institutional affiliation into account. The affective response to a *judge* catches structural properties such as institutional authority in the legal system. Representing the corporate world, an *employer* would fall in the authority category.

The more the meaning of identities overlap the smaller will be their Euclidian distance of EPA profiles of affective meaning. If two role identities are measured on EPA dimensions, their Euclidian distance can be formulated as follows:

FIGURE 1 HERE

Euclidian distances (see figure 1) within one structural category are summed up. This sum is standardized to create a distance measure that remains comparable across categories. Since structural properties are the main organizing principles of role identities, minimizing the Euclidean distances reveals structural categories. This logic is laid out in detail in the "Classification and the Relations of Meaning" (Schneider and Roberts 2004). Here an algorithm is provided for the process of identifying the appropriate number of clusters producing distinctive denotations. Using this algorithm in the investigation of the German and U.S. data, a 6- cluster solution using the K-means method in SYSTAT (Wilkinson 1988) is interpreted as offering the most robust and distinctive clusters. Table 1 reports the cluster means of the authority cluster for males and females in both cultures. The remaining five clusters of denotative meaning that are "sexual-erotic," "winner," "loser," "family," and "deviant" in the German cluster solution. Since U.S. subjects failed to differentiate between sexual eroticism and violence these two clusters merged (Schneider 2002a). Due to the extreme love for the hyper authority, "God" emerged as a one-item cluster. In the following, the focus will be exclusively on the authority clusters in both cultures.

<TABLE 1 HERE>

For the sake of cross-cultural comparison an inter-cultural authority cluster is formed. The inter-cultural authority cluster includes only concepts that are in both the U.S. and the German cluster solution. The composition of the U.S. and the German clusters are quite similar, and 79% of the German authoritative role identities are represented in the U.S. authority cluster. Creating the inter-cultural authority cluster demonstrates that there are largely the same authority

figures in Germany and The United States.

Interpretation of the Inter-cultural Authority Cluster

Most of the concepts in the inter-cultural authority cluster are easily recognizable as authorities (see Table 2). Given the right analytical framework even some seemingly odd cases, like *barkeeper*, can be identified as authorities. If I compare a barkeeper within the institution of a hotel to other roles like *waitress*, he is powerful in the sense that he controls the scene, prompts conversation, and shelters customers from inappropriate behavior of other guests. In contrast to the waitress, he is less vivid and in some cases even delegates tasks to other employees.

In some cases, however, roles are more ambiguous and I have problems identifying their institutional character. *Fisherman* is such a case, where I do not really know what the undergraduate subjects had in mind when they rated this role in such a way that it ended up in the authority clusters. In judging the face validity of the clusters, the reader has to keep in mind that the ratings are made by young adults who, in their subculture, might differ systematically from the reader in their assessment of roles.

<TABLE 2 HERE>

Since my interpretation of the sets of identities as authoritative is subject to my personal biases, I turned to 24 experts about the concepts of identity and authority[4]. These experts had to identify the identities as authorities. The answers "definitely an authority" are coded with two, "maybe an authority" with one, and "definitely not an authority" with zero. ANOVA analysis reveals that all clusters have significantly different authority ratings (a ?.01). The null hypothesis

that ratings of authoritativeness are equal in all clusters is clearly rejected in the U.S. cluster solution.

In a next step, I determine if the role identities, classified by raters as authorities, are indeed located in the empirical authority cluster. The classification ratings differed only marginally for males and females. Therefore, authority classification ratings (AUT, last column in table 2) of males and females are merged for conceptual simplicity. Role identities, whose authority rating is on the average one or larger, are interpreted as categorized by subjects as authorities. This analysis shows that, not only did subjects clearly distinguish the *authority* rating in each cluster, they also classified 85% of the empirically classified identities as authorities. Table 2 lists all identities of the cluster statistically classified as the common component of the US and German cluster solutions. These identities are ordered according to their empirical authority rating. The bottom of this list shows the 15% of the identities of the empirically classified authorities that did not get identified by expert raters. They contain the odd case of *fisherman* mentioned above.

To address doubts if mature expert raters come to the same conclusion as the original population of undergraduate subjects that engaged in the EPA ratings, this structural classification was also conducted with 123 undergraduate subjects of a Midwestern university. The classification by undergraduates identified 81% of the authority identities that were identified by the mathematical cluster solution based on affective meaning. This is only marginally less accurate than the results achieved with expert raters.

Cluster Means and Dimension Means

T-tests for the cluster means of the inter-cultural authority cluster showed that ratings on

EPA dimensions were different across cultures and across genders at a <.01 levels of significance. Gender differences can be interpreted as sub-cultural differences, and comparing gender differences with cultural differences permits an assessment of the magnitude of cross-cultural differences (Schneider 2002b). Since it is more likely that we are experienced in estimating cross gender differences than cross-cultural differences, cross-gender differences serve as a useful benchmark to access cross-cultural differences. As we see in Table 3, cultural differences are consistently larger than gender differences (about 0.3 for every measurement), whereas the gender differences are about 0.1 in Germany and between 0.1 and 0.2 in the U.S.

<TABLE 3 HERE>

Comparing the dimension means of all identities with the cluster means of the authority cluster, is a simple procedure that tests for a possible alternative explanation that a culture specific general rating tendency caused the authority pattern. The same comparison also shows the relative position of the authority concept within the semantic space shared by all identities. We can see that authorities have a higher status, more potency, and less expressivity than the average of all identity concepts. This is true in both cultures and for both males and females.

To test for a general causal connection between the potency and evaluation of identities, all ratings of 420 identities are taken into account, and their evaluation dimension is regressed on their potency dimension. Beta coefficients in the U.S. sample are significant (a ?.01) and positive (males .40, females .31). In the German data, there is no such evaluation of potency. German females show no significant influence of the potency of an identity on its evaluation dimension (beta=-.03). German males even show significant (a <.05) devaluation or

stigmatization of potency (beta=-.14). The high positive correlation in the U.S. data suggests that there is a legitimation principle that allows the assignment of high evaluation to powerful role identities. In the German culture, this legitimation rule appears to be absent, or, as in the case of the German males, a devaluation rule seems to be present. Tests for the causal connection within the common component of authoritative identities follow the same pattern. The evaluation of authorities is high for U.S. males and females, and despite the small number of authority identities (n=53), it is statistically significant. There is no significant relation between the evaluation and potency dimension in case for German authorities.

The ideal typical operationalization of the authority concept allows the graphical representation of structural pattern in semantic space. Figure two shows this method for the inter-cultural comparison of the authority concept. In the graphical representation, the theoretical scheme and the empirical results of the clustering procedure are compared. The figure shows that we do find the hypothesized authority pattern in both cultures and in both sexes. The U.S. data confirm the authoritative ideal type (E high, P high and A low) to a greater extent than the German data. In the U.S. data, evaluation and potency are high for authority roles and activity is low. The German means, on the other hand, are all attenuated. Thus, the Germans do not fulfill the ideal type developed above as well as the Americans do, though the general pattern is right.

Comparing all three dimension means with the cluster means demonstrated that cross-cultural differences found in the distinctiveness of the authority pattern are not caused by general rating tendencies. This test also served as an additional test of the authority concept having a unique pattern. The strong positive correlation of the evaluation and potency dimension in the U.S. culture supports the argument that there is a love for power. This is not the case in Germany, where males even tend to stigmatize identities for its power. Analyzing identities that

are seen as authorities in both cultures, the ratings of the U.S. subjects follow the ideal typical pattern of an authority to a larger extent than the German subjects. The graphical representation of the authority cluster means is used as a more refined way to compare the cultural differences to the ideal type of authority and to control for gender differences.

Discussion

Traditionally Germans are seen to love their authorities. "The German is noted for his unquestioning obedience to authority, his failure to exercise individual responsibility and act on the basis of independent moral judgment" (McGranaham 1946, pp.247-248). Comparing U.S. and German youth in 1945, McGranahan's found in his empirical investigation of Germans were indeed more submissive to authority than Americans. The fact that the study was conducted under U.S. occupation made scientists conclude that differences had been larger without the subject effect according to which "German youth have a strong propensity to conform to what they consider to be the official creed of their new rulers" (p.245). The stereotypical view of obedience being a German trait was dramatically challenged by experiments of Milgram stating in 1960 (1969), and later by Zimbardo's "Stanford Prison Experiment" (1973). More recent comparative studies, utilizing representative national samples, show an authoritative trend in the U.S. population that is absent in European countries including Germany (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Baker 2000).

Legitimation is a matter of legitimation rules. Consider a surgeon-patient interaction to see this. In asking $10,000 for half an hour operation, the *surgeon* exercises power over the *patient*. Since the *surgeon* uses state of the art technology that is accepted in his culture, his request will be seen as legitimate. However, if he does not use culturally approved technology,

he will be seen as a *quack*. This example demonstrates that legitimation rules are dependent on culture and are subject to change over time.[5] Empirical examples of identities that share the potency and activity dimension with the ideal typical authority concept, but will be devaluated because of the missing legitimation, are *gangsters* and *mafiosi*.

Individual behavior results in social reproduction and establishes totality which can be called culture. Culture in turn influences the behavior of the agent. The interdependency of individual behavior and organizational structure is a fact already mentioned by Max Weber. Weber explained the influence of the rational principle of institutions on the individual as well as the feedback effect of the individual on the institution. Max Weber pointed out the superiority of a certain type of economic or political system, the rational bureaucratic model. This rational bureaucratic institutional system, he claimed, is more efficient than any other form of institution and it provides institutions with authorization and resources. Cross-cultural differences in the authority concept will influence institutional behavior, creating potential miscommunications in multicultural corporations (Schneider 2002c). These misunderstandings, in turn, will be a source of conflict in the social construction of multicultural institutions.

For Max Weber the principle of authorization is a universal principle of institutions supporting their domination. The rational principle is not only an institutional principle, but also a principle of individual reasoning. Weber sees workers as brainwashed wheels in the clockwork of bureaucratic organizations, believing in the rational principles of the institution they are working for.[6] In their management application, Kieser & Kubiceck (1978) agree with Weber that the bureaucratic principle is not restricted to the macro level of institutions, but it is a part of the cognitive structure of the actor.

Giddens' model of duality of structure explains this micro-macro interdependence

differently, but is very much in line with Weber argument of the domination of the rational bureaucratic principle. Weber assumed the shared principle of bureaucratic rationality as a concept of micro-macro interdependence; Giddens sees the actor dependent on signification, domination and legitimation, which are structural properties (Giddens, 1979; 2000). Signification is the representation of structural features and rules in language. Domination refers to the authorization and allocation of resources. Authorization refers to the "capabilities that generate command over persons" (1979, p.100), allocation refers to the "capabilities that generate command over objects" (p.100). Legitimation refers to rules of normative regulations.

According to Weber, legitimation is organized by the rational bureaucratic principle. Since institutions of domination and institutions of legitimation, are organized by the same principle they are able to communicate with each other and protect each other from the influence of other organizational principles. The rational bureaucratic principle in legislative institutions and legislative reasoning is just another bar in Weber's iron cage. Institutions of legitimation and domination are interdependent and support each other. They are bound together by their mutual interest to spread their rational bureaucratic principle in order to be supported by other institutions or actors using this principle.

Efficiency, as explained in Weber's *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* makes the rational bureaucratic form the most frequent form of institution spread all over the world. In contrast to Giddens, Weber made a descriptive, but not theoretical difference between political or economic institutions. Both types of institutions can be organized according to the same rational bureaucratic principle. The trend of bureaucratization, the stability of bureaucratic institutions and the inability to reverse this trend ("*Rücklaufsperre*"), was seen by Weber at the beginning of the 20th century. Since Weber's forecast became truth, and at the beginning of the 21st century,

we are still facing a uniform principle of bureaucratic institutions in Western cultures, the representation of the predominant principle of authority in the affective meaning of U.S. and German subjects is not surprising.

Since Western cultures share Weber's principle of rational bureaucratic organization to a large extent, the agreement in the classification of authorities is not surprising. This rational bureaucratic principle, that centrally involves rules of legitimation that establish the authority concept, is reproduced at a micro level. The micro representation is measured with affective meaning. Macro structural properties such as authority, captured in this micro representation, are represented by emerging structural categories. The ideal typical representation of authority, operationalized as patterns of affective meanings, was prevalent in Germany and the US. Cross cultural differences were, therefore, not a matter of principle but of degree. High cross-cultural agreement in the categorization as authorities helped the cross-cultural comparison by allowing the comparison to be made within the common component of authorities. Comparing the average EPA ratings within this common component of authorities cross culturally, I find that U.S. subjects follow the ideal type of high evaluation and potency and low activity to a greater extent than Germans. Thus, the Germans do not fulfill the ideal type as well as the Americans do, though the general pattern of EPA ratings is right. U.S. subjects value authoritative identities more than Germans. Generally, U.S. subjects showed higher admiration of powerful identities, which in turn were disliked for their power potential by Germans.

I cannot investigate the reasons for these cultural differences in the authority concept here in detail. Trying to avoid falling into stereotypical generalizations of people, national differences I found might be rooted in the Americans' overall admiration of power. Power toys, like monster trucks, motorboats, and guns are an obsession amongst many Americans. Extreme exercise of

power, as reflected in corporal punishment, extreme long term prison sentences, even for victimless crimes (Black 1980, Goode 1997), and the willingness to wage wars, is seen as legitimated by large parts of the U.S. population. This love of power and the legitimation of power for authorities appear to be less prevalent in contemporary Germany.

This is empirically reflected in the comparison of all 420 identities. When all identities are compared, U.S. subjects show positive evaluations of powerful identities, which in turn were disliked for their power potential by Germans. In Germany, rules to legitimate authorities seem not to be as dominant as in The United States. Mistrust against authorities is higher and the bumper sticker "question authority" might have more truth in Germany.[7] Without going into an extended discussion of the underlying reasons of the cross-cultural differences between German and U.S. undergraduates, I want at least point out one possibility underlying cultural reason for the devaluation of authority concepts by Germans. The re-education program in Germany after World War II (Fischer, 1978; Tent, 1982), imposed by the Allied Forces, initiated a cultural change that influenced attitudes toward authorities. German pupils were systematically encouraged to develop anti-authoritarian standpoints. The re-education might have been successful in changing legitimation rules for authorities, and thereby in making Germans view their authorities as relatively oppressive rather than authoritative. This is of course only one of many possible explanations of why German subjects rejected authoritative role identities, whereas U.S. subjects embraced them in their general evaluation of potent identities.

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$$\text{Euclidian Distance} = \sqrt{(E_{i1}-E_{i2})^2 + (P_{i1}-P_{i2})^2 + (A_{i1}-A_{i2})^2}$$

E	Evaluation
P	Potency
A	Activity
i1	Identity one
i2	Identity two

Figure 1. Euclidian distance measures between identities



Figure 2. Empirical versus Ideal Profiles.

Table 1. Authority Cluster means of the U.S. and German 6-cluster Solution.

	U.S. Authority	German Authority
Evaluation males	.97	.93
Potency males	.81	.52
Activity males	-.36	.07
Evaluation females	1.15	1.11
Potency females	.91	.65
Activity females	-.22	.18
Cases	n=111	n = 87

Table 2. 53 Identities and their EPA Ratings in the Common Component of the German and U.S. Listed in order of the Authority Ratings (AUT).

	American ratings							German ratings						
	males			females				males			females			
Concept	E	P	A	E	P	A	Concept	E	P	A	E	P	A	AUT
mother	2.52	1.50	-.13	2.33	1.90	.04	Mutter	2.16	.05	-.01	1.70	.69	.06	2.0
parent	1.77	1.95	-.82	2.56	2.34	-.46	Elternteil	1.25	.41	.22	1.31	.84	.67	2.0
tutor	1.06	.92	-.46	1.38	1.06	-.21	Nachhilfelehrer	.29	.46	-.06	.89	.48	-.23	2.0
attorney	.82	1.88	-.25	.85	2.02	-.43	Anwalt	.40	.76	.03	.67	.89	-.02	1.8
counselor	1.24	.99	-.14	1.42	1.28	-.14	Ratgeber	1.28	.72	-.33	1.41	.80	-.26	1.8
professor	1.17	1.17	-.57	.96	1.14	-.57	Professor	.60	.12	-.56	.55	.38	.20	1.8
surgeon	1.81	2.09	-.21	1.63	1.88	-.25	Chirurg	.59	.45	-.66	.72	.74	-.28	1.8
academic	1.10	.71	-.50	.85	.75	-.50	Akademiker	.60	.68	-.26	.82	.37	.11	1.7
advisor	.99	1.28	-.71	1.35	1.31	-.57	Berater	.96	.68	.06	1.38	.82	-.30	1.7
architect	1.06	1.17	-.14	1.06	.92	-.04	Architekten	.68	.24	-.14	.97	.41	.02	1.7
busdriver	.71	.28	-.04	.75	.25	.28	Busfahrer	.16	.89	-.08	.39	.93	-.07	1.7
chef	.89	.18	-.11	1.03	.53	-.43	Chefkoch	.96	1.01	.61	1.02	1.01	.81	1.7
confidant	1.81	1.60	-.21	2.17	1.03	.46	Vertrauter	1.79	.46	-.23	2.22	.77	-.38	1.7
detective	.60	1.21	.21	1.06	1.53	.21	Detektiv	.11	.67	-.16	.21	.57	-.02	1.7
lawyer	.85	1.56	.04	1.28	1.81	.35	Rechtsanwalt	.67	.95	.01	.66	.89	.26	1.7
psychoanalyst	.53	1.06	-.85	.99	.96	-.50	Psychoanalytiker	.33	.51	-.57	.37	.51	-.45	1.7
psychologist	.67	.85	-.53	.89	1.21	-.25	Psychologe	.56	-.10	-.61	.72	.49	-.27	1.7
specialist	1.24	1.53	-.43	1.49	2.06	.04	Spezialist	.81	.48	-.34	.99	.47	-.11	1.7
father	1.77	2.13	-.67	2.34	1.88	-.35	Vater	1.52	1.04	.28	1.24	1.15	.24	1.5
genius	1.24	1.35	.04	1.14	1.42	-.04	Genie	.76	.28	-.31	.94	.16	.29	1.5
grandparent	2.24	.71	-1.77	2.52	1.03	-1.63	Großelternteil	1.46	.04	-.27	1.32	.29	-.04	1.5
grownup	1.06	1.35	-.75	1.38	1.53	-.39	Erwachsener	.29	.88	.25	.62	.84	.05	1.5
host	1.21	1.10	.28	1.53	1.17	.46	Gastgeber	1.40	.69	.40	1.63	.77	.61	1.5
nightwatchman	.53	0.00	-1.10	.60	.57	-.92	Nachtwächter	.62	.61	-.62	.65	.71	-.42	1.5
nurse	1.74	1.17	-.11	2.52	.99	.04	Krankenschwester	1.05	.27	.50	.91	.46	.43	1.5
probation_of	.64	1.14	-.18	.60	1.42	.32	Bewährungshelfer	.90	.53	-.38	1.41	.88	-.06	1.5
intimate	1.53	.92	.11	2.13	1.28	-.35	eng Vetrauter	1.88	.26	.06	1.97	.84	-.42	1.5
judge	.89	2.34	-1.70	.99	2.80	-1.14	Richter	.26	1.19	-.45	.39	1.23	-.24	1.5
veterinarian	1.63	1.03	-.28	1.88	1.21	.11	Veterenär	.52	.79	.23	.53	.91	.29	1.5
aunt	1.18	.03	-.69	1.30	.16	-.18	Tante	.78	.14	.54	1.31	.52	.62	1.3
author	1.28	1.21	-.25	.99	.32	-.07	Autor	1.05	.33	-.19	1.27	.41	-.09	1.3
barkeeper	.96	.39	-.04	.57	.60	.25	Barkeeper	1.02	.81	.64	1.43	.70	1.15	1.3
grandfather	2.17	1.31	-1.77	2.27	1.35	-1.60	Großvater	1.49	.53	-.45	1.64	.89	-.28	1.3
instructor	.82	1.46	.14	.89	1.31	-.14	Dozent	.31	.44	.23	.60	.56	.08	1.3
technician	.78	.64	.39	1.06	.85	.43	Techniker	.47	.60	.04	.48	.44	.10	1.3
connoisseur	.85	.35	-.32	.99	.28	.14	Kunstkenner	.90	-.08	-.58	1.29	.08	-.07	1.2
fa_in_law	.89	.71	-.78	1.77	1.06	-.89	Schwiegervater	.44	.88	.46	.79	.64	.22	1.2
gourmet	.89	.18	-.18	.71	.25	.18	Gourmet	.84	.43	-.47	.96	.19	-.37	1.2
colleague	1.28	.99	.25	1.31	.75	.35	Kollege	1.13	.61	.53	.75	.38	.38	1.0
cook	.78	-.11	-.25	.99	.32	-.35	Koch	1.14	.84	.28	1.36	1.07	.82	1.0
diner	.46	.11	-.32	.57	.14	-.07	Tischgast	.84	.06	.18	1.00	.11	-.00	1.0
fellow	1.35	.43	.21	1.31	.35	.60	Gefährte	1.84	.55	.38	1.99	.74	.48	1.0
gentleman	2.06	1.42	-.53	2.49	1.46	-.11	Herr	.17	.82	-.02	.52	.84	-.17	1.0
storyteller	1.21	.28	-.46	1.74	.35	-.50	Geschichtenerzäler	1.46	.15	-.05	1.96	.34	-.14	1.0
tv_repairman	.85	.11	-.04	.85	.64	-.04	Fernsehmechaniker	.41	.47	.13	.64	.56	.01	1.0
electrician	.64	.39	.46	.99	.71	-.14	Elektriker	.27	.38	.02	.63	.59	.10	0.8
uncle	1.56	.99	-.46	1.10	.67	-.35	Onkel	1.16	.78	-.12	1.39	1.07	.28	0.8
baker	1.06	-.25	-.50	1.35	.32	-.64	Bäcker	.88	.75	.41	1.26	1.14	.43	0.7
christian	1.49	.82	-.07	1.88	.96	0.00	Christ	.42	.09	-.08	.78	.29	.03	0.7
guest	1.14	-.35	-.25	1.70	0.00	-.18	Gast	1.10	.16	.45	1.52	.49	.58	0.3
mailman	1.24	-.07	-.75	1.74	.18	-.39	Briefträger	1.00	-.08	.37	1.24	.28	.35	0.7
visitor	1.38	.43	-.07	1.06	-.21	0.00	Besucher	.96	.22	.46	1.27	.52	.46	0.7
fisherman	.60	-.21	-1.14	1.10	.07	-.82	Fischer	1.23	.95	-.57	.99	.70	-.57	0.5

Table 3: German and U.S. means of the exclusive authority cluster (N=53), for males and females in brackets.

	German males (females)		American males (females)	
Dimensions	Cluster mean	Dimension mean	Cluster mean	Dimension mean
Evaluation	0.87 (1.05)	0.09 (0.23)	1.17 (1.37)	0.10 (0.28)
Potency	0.51 (0.64)	0.27 (0.36)	0.88 (0.98)	0.08 (0.26)
Activity	-0.01 (0.09)	0.43 (0.43)	-0.37 (-0.22)	0.43 (0.46)

Endnotes:

[1] Examples with identities are taken from empirical simulations of these data following Affect Control Theory. The following example of the labeling of the *physician* as a *quack*, is the result of an interaction of a *physician* with a *patient* in which culturally inadequate methods were used. The use of the male gender expresses the use of the data of male subjects in the simulations. The reader should be reminded that with this empirical devotion I use a restricted vocabulary (420 identity words) that might appear strange when expecting the language of a scholarly article. Rather than describing the complex nature of these simulations here, I refer the reader to the literature of Heise (1987), Heise and Levis (1988), Schneider and Heise (1995), Schneider (1991, 2001), Smith-Lovin (1987), and MacKinnon (1994).

[2] The "Gymnasium" is the German educational equivalent to the American high school, a prerequisite for entering university that lasts two years longer than the American High school. A total of 380 subjects participated.

[3] The study of Romney et al. (1986) makes an empirically and methodologically well-backed argument for the representativeness and validity of the information gained from of a small number of informants. Testing his model with a sample of 41 informants, he compares the results to a sub sample of four informants. He concludes that under certain conditions, four informants can produce sufficiently valid and reliable information about a culture. It is possible, for example, to correctly classify 99% of the 41 true or false questions with a 95% confidence level when four highly competent informers are used. Using informers with very low cultural competence we would need 29 informers.

[4] My sample of 24 expert raters for the *authority* concepts were recruited from a graduate seminar on self and identity at Indiana University. Subjects were knowledgeable about the concepts of identity and authority. To minimize the workload of this rating task, each subject received only a subset of 1/4 of all role identities. Each of the 420 role identities is rated by 24/4=6 expert rates as definitely an authority, maybe an authority, or definitely not an authority. This sample is in no way comparable with the sample of undergraduate students used to collect the German and American data on EPA profiles.

[5] Weber (1946) described three cultural rules of legitimation where authorities are classified as traditional, charismatic or bureaucratic/rational. Variation of the type of rule currently in use in particular culture might be a fruitful basis for further research. This research is of course not restricted to the three rules described by Weber eight decades ago. Perhaps in leaving the age of modernity (Giddens, 1990, 1991), people are about to establish other rules of legitimation such as political or ecological correctness.

[6] "Jeder Arbeiter [wird] zu einem Rädchen in dieser Maschine und innerlich zunehmend darauf abgestimmt, sich als ein solches zu fühlen..."(Weber 1924, p.413).

[7] I am not suggesting a "sociology of bumper stickers", however, it is worth mentioning that in the United States we recently see more bumper stickers stating "Question Liberalism."