Trait Attribution and Its Logic

    This section develops affect control theory's equations for trait attribution and then analyzes the logic of trait attribution, comparing that logic with the logic applying to mood attribution or to labeling with new identities.

    Affect control theory treats a personal trait as a trans-situational particulizer of identity. The EPA profile, p, combines with the situational identity that a person adopts, r, and generates the personal fundamental profile, f_S, that the self confirms in the situation.

    In reidentification, f_S specifies the personal self that accounts for a past event when the event is viewed as confirming f_S.The profile for the personal self that is affirmed by a given event is defined by equation (46) if reidentifying an actor ("who would do such an action?") or by equation (54) if reidentifying an object ("Who befits such an action?"). When these equations were presented, the profiles that they define were used to label the individual with a new identity. Now, however, f_S is viewed as an amalgamation of trait and role, and we seek to specify the trait that combines with the individual's role identity in such a way as to explain the observed event.

    Knowing the profile, f_S, that is being confirmed situationally, the next question is what trait profile, p, is required in order to convert the profile for the person's situational identity, r, into f_S? The solution is obtained via (62b) - the same equation as was used in developing an emotion model, except we now change the symbols standing for emotion (E, e, E_e, E_p, E_a) to symbols standing for any particularizer (P, p, P_e, P_p, P_a), and we change the q standing for a transient to f_S since we are accounting for an inferred fundamental state instead of accounting for a transient state. With these substitutions, and understanding the other terms as defined for equation (62b), the solution is the same as for the emotion model, Equation (63).

(65)

[The section above, including the equation, was revised October, 2000.]

    The model has some implications regarding trait inference, as it did for emotions. First, the trait that is inferred in order to account for a particular event will vary depending on the person's initial situational identity. Thus, participating in the same happening in the same way could imply different traits for people with different identities. Second, trait inferences about a person with an extremely negative situational identity should be chaotic, depending on minor variations in participation.

    Now I turn to the logic of constructing notions of people.

Logic of Person Construction

    Personality traits (like "introverted" or "hostile") distinguish the manner in which an individual participates in events from the manner that is expected due to situation. If we focus on attributional processes, then traits amount to interpreting abnormal situational participation as normal individual participation. If we focus on personality theory, traits are dispositions for individualistic styles of participation that cause abnormal situational participation.

(66)

    EPA profiles for situational identities produce normal situational participation as the individual attempts to confirm the profiles through event constructions. In particular, situationally-normal participation requires events that minimumly deflect transients from the fundamental self profile, f_S, corresponding to the person's situational identity, or participating in events that repair a prior non-confirmatory event by maximally reducing deflections left from the prior event. Accordingly, abnormal situational participation consists of participating in events that do not minimize deflections from f_S, while failing to participate in events that could reduce f_S deflections when such repair events are possible.

    Thus the schematic above can be rewritten as follows.

(67)

    By this formulation traits are evident only in retrospect after it is clear that a situationally abnormal event will not be repaired. In particular, the trigger for attributing a trait consists of (1) an event that disconfirms a person's situational identity, (2) an opportunity to participate in an event that would repair the consequences of the prior disconfirming event, and (3) foregoing the repair opportunity. At that point, a trait that accounts for the first event is required in order understand the person's actions, and attributing such a trait explains the person's individualistic participation in the situation.

    A trait is a trans-situational modifier of identity, so assigning a trait has implications beyond the immediate situation.

(68)

Transposition yields the conditions for a trait being absent.

(69)

By this formulation, inference of a particular trait that explains a person's current behavior is abandoned if a disconfirmation in another situation is recollected (a disconfirmation is an instance in which the person acted abnormally, assuming he or she has the trait). A trait inference is warranted as long as no such instance is recollected.

    Reidentification includes several possibilities aside from trait inference. First, one might suppose that an individualistic style of participation causing abnormal situational participation arises from a mood - a situational rather than trans-situational disposition. The participatory conditions for a mood attribution are the same as for a trait attribution - proposition (67). However, the logic for presuming a mood is different. Instead of (68) we have

(70)

and the transposition gives conditions for a mood being absent

(71)

Thus a mood attribution has to explain any recollected individual idiosyncracy in the current situation in order to be warranted.

    Second, one might suppose that situationally abnormal participation arises not from modification of situational identity but from adoption of a governing social identity other than the one believed to be operative. To have an institutionalized social identity a person must be established in the identity through ritual commissioning or by ascription from physical features.

(72)

Considerable community work would be required to give an institutionalized identity to someone who does not already have it. This contrasts to the personal accounting of a person's actions through trait attributions.

    A person has an informal social identity if there exists a circumstance - a specific event opportunity in a given situation - in which the person participates in a role production associated with the identity while foregoing role actions for alternative identities that would be appropriate in that circumstance.

(73)

The transposition defines the conditions for rejecting the notion that a person has the informal social identity.

(74)

Thus an attribution of informal identity is unwarranted if no instance can be recalled in which the person did the kind of thing characteristic of that identity. It also is unwarranted if in every recollected circumstance the person's participation can be interpreted as an action characteristic of other appropriate identities. In particular, an abnormal participation with regard to one situational identity does not warrant inference of a new informal identity if the person's participation always can be viewed as confirming or repairing other identities in his or her situational repertoire of roles.